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MAKING TAXIS GREEN: HYBRID CAB 
PROGRAMS AND THE DEBATE OVER 
PREEMPTION IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION 
J.D. Holden* 
Abstract: In the past few years, many cities have attempted to mandate 
the use of hybrid taxicabs. The taxi industry, arguing that the Energy Pol-
icy and Conservation Act and the Clean Air Act preempt such mandates, 
has successfully opposed them. Mandating hybrid cab use, however, is but 
one important aspect of a larger push by states and local governments to 
enact progressive environmental legislation and policies with greater 
breadth than those of the federal government. An example is California’s 
battle to enact greenhouse gas emissions regulations and its conflict with 
the Environmental Protection Agency. Though New York City and Boston 
lost on preemption grounds, their attempts are important in the context 
of the battle over environmental federalism. In the long term, the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act should be amended to allow for more pro-
gressive environmental regulations at the state and local level. 
Introduction 
 Recently, several state and local governments have taken a more 
progressive approach to combating climate change and other envi-
ronmental problems through regulations at the state and local level.1 
California’s Assembly Bill 1493 (AB-1493), which focused on the prob-
lem of vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases, was one prominent initia-
tive of this kind.2 However, there were many smaller and more localized 
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2009–2010. 
1 See David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallo-
cating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1796, 1844–49 (2008); Patrick 
Parenteau, Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way: The States Tackle Climate Change with Little Help 
from Washington, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1453, 1455–56 (2008); Christopher T. Giovinazzo, 
Comment, California’s Global Warming Bill: Will Fuel Economy Preemption Curb California’s Air 
Pollution Leadership?, 30 Ecology L.Q. 893, 907–09 (2003). 
2 See Kevin Gaynor & Mara Zimmerman, Federal Approaches to Climate Change: Federal 
Preemption of State Climate Change Laws, SN062 A.L.I-A.B.A. 813, 821–29 (2008); Parenteau, 
supra note 1, at 1466–72; Giovinazzo, supra note 1, at 895–904; see also Kate Galbraith, Cali-
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programs of importance, such as many cities’ efforts to facilitate the 
transition to hybrid taxicabs.3 
 Multiple cities developed programs to encourage the use of hybrid 
taxis on their streets: most focused on incentives, but some cities used 
regulation and legislation to require taxi owners to transition to hybrid 
cabs.4 Examples include Boston and New York City.5 Resistance to these 
initiatives was apparent, and a suit to stop New York City’s hybrid cab 
regulations filed by the taxi industry was one of the more noticeable 
examples of such resistance.6 The taxi industry’s resistance to New York 
City’s mandate-style hybrid cab regulations was, in the end, successful, 
as was the resistance to Boston’s mandate.7 
 Opponents to state and local regulations have challenged them on 
similar preemption grounds.8 Opponents challenged California’s AB-
1493 on the grounds that it was preempted by federal statute.9 AB-1493 
                                                                                                                      
fornia and Texas: Alternative Energy’s Odd Couple, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 2009, at WK3 (discuss-
ing state regulations and private investments in lieu of federal action). 
3 See generally Press Release, Mass. Port Auth., Massachusetts Port Authority Along with 
the City of Boston Announce First Cab Incentive Program to Encourage the Use of Hybrid 
and Alternate Fuel Vehicles (Apr. 23, 2007), available at http://www.massport.com/about/ 
press_news_cleanvehiclehtml.html [hereinafter Massport Press Release] (describing Boston’s 
hybrid cab incentives); City of Boston, CleanAir CABS Brochure, http://www. 
http://www.bphc.org/programs/cib/environmentalhealth/Forms%20%20Documents/Bost
on%20CleanAir%20CABSB.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2010) [hereinafter CleanAir CABS 
Brochure] (describing Boston’s hybrid cab incentives); Brittany Kaplan, Chicago Cabbies 
Giving Green Rides as New Law Mandates More Hybrids, Medhill Rep.-Chicago, June 27, 2007, 
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=38895 (describing Chicago’s 
attempt to encourage hybrid cab use); San Francisco Taxicab Comm’n, Financial Incentives 
for Low Emissions Taxis, http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/site/taxicommission_page.asp?id=78183 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2010) [hereinafter San Francisco Taxi Comm’n] (describing San Fran-
cisco’s hybrid cab incentives). 
4 See, e.g., Press Release, City of Boston, Mayor Menino Announces Taxi Fleet to be Ful-
ly Hybrid by 2015 (Aug. 29, 2008), available at http://www.cityofboston.gov/news/default. 
aspx?id=3967) [hereinafter Menino Press Release] (illustrating Boston’s switch to a man-
date approach). 
5 See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 07837(PAC), 2008 
WL 4866021, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) [Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I ] (describing 
New York City’s failed mandate); Menino Press Release, supra note 4 (describing Boston’s 
failed mandate). 
6 See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *15 (granting an injunction 
preventing New York City’s hybrid cab regulations from taking effect). 
7 See Ophir v. City of Boston, No. 09-10467-WGY, 2009 WL 2606341, at *6 (D. Mass. 
Aug. 14, 2009); Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *15; Jonathan Saltzman, 
Hybrid Mandate for Taxis Reversed, Boston Globe, Aug. 15, 2009, at A1. 
8 See Gaynor & Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 827. 
9 See id. See generally Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 
(E.D. Cal. 2007) (plaintiffs claimed preemption of AB-1493 under the EPCA and the 
CAA). 
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became part of a larger debate over the nature of environmental feder-
alism and the future of local environmental initiatives to combat cli-
mate change and other environmental problems.10 
 This Note examines the conflict over New York City’s hybrid cab 
regulations, what New York City can do to alter them to meet its goals, 
and how the conflict fits into the larger debate over preemption and 
environmental federalism and its effects on other cities. This Note will 
discuss New York City’s regulations and AB-1493 as representative of 
the more general conflict discussed above. Part I examines the struc-
ture of hybrid cab programs and the difference between an incentive 
structure and mandate structure, using Boston as an example.11 Part II 
examines New York City’s hybrid cab regulations and their defeat in 
litigation under the preemption doctrine.12 Part III explores the larger 
debate over environmental federalism and the preemption doctrine 
using AB-1493 as an example, and then discusses the fate of Boston’s 
hybrid cab mandate after the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York struck down New York City’s program.13 Part IV ana-
lyzes New York City’s options, and then explores why initiatives such as 
New York City’s are important and why they should prompt a change in 
thinking about federal preemption.14 
I. Hybrid Cab Programs and the Lead up to New York 
A. Boston’s Hybrid Cab Program 
1. The Incentive Approach 
 The City of Boston created the CleanAir Cabs program to promote 
the adoption of hybrid cabs.15 The CleanAir Cabs program defined it-
self as a “partnership of government agencies, private businesses, and 
community members dedicated to reducing fuel costs and air pollution 
through the introduction of hybrid and alternative fuel vehicles to Bos-
                                                                                                                      
10 See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1796–1801, 1846–49; Gaynor & Zimmerman, 
supra note 2, at 815, 821–31; Parenteau, supra note 1, at 1455–56. 
11 See infra Part I. 
12 See infra Part II. 
13 See infra Part III. 
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 See CleanAir CABS Brochure, supra note 3; Massport Press Release, supra note 3. 
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ton’s taxi industry.”16 The goal was to promote hybrid cabs as more ef-
ficient vehicles with lower fuel costs.17 
 The CleanAir Cabs Program contained several incentives to en-
courage hybrid cab use.18 As part of the program, hybrid taxis received 
special privileges when lining up at Logan International Airport, which 
were designed to shorten the waiting time for cab drivers.19 Less time 
spent in the taxi queue meant that drivers could make “an additional 
two airport trips per twelve hour shift with an average fare of $25.”20 In 
addition, on April 23, 2007, Boston Mayor Thomas Menino announced 
a $25,000 grant “awarded to . . . increase participation in the CleanAir 
Cab program by offsetting extra costs associated with purchasing a new 
hybrid or alternative fuel vehicle.”21 
 Despite the incentives, Boston did not obtain the results it desired 
and drivers raised objections based on the cost of transitioning to the 
more efficient vehicles.22 After eighteen months, only thirty-two of Bos-
ton’s 1825 cabs were hybrids; the city had hoped for at least 100.23 The 
main problem limiting adoption of hybrid cabs seems to have been the 
price of the vehicles themselves.24 The hybrids “cost nearly $30,000 af-
ter [they were] customized to meet taxi regulations.”25 Most drivers 
used “Ford Crown Victorias from police department surpluses that usu-
ally cost less than $10,000.”26 
 The preference system at Logan Airport and tax credits were not 
enough to encourage widespread hybrid cab adoption,27 though both 
were a large part of Boston’s attempts to encourage hybrid cab use by 
convincing drivers that they would save on fuel costs and receive federal 
tax credits.28 The Director of the Licensing Division of the Boston Po-
lice Department, Marc Cohen, called the lack of adoption a “momen-
tum issue,” and said that the conversion to hybrid cabs “seemed to be 
                                                                                                                      
16 CleanAir CABS Brochure, supra note 3. 
17 See id. 
18 See Noah Bierman & Matthew P. Collette, City Hopes Hybrid Taxis Gain Steam, Boston 
Globe, Mar. 9, 2008, at B2. 
19 See id. 
20 Massport Press Release, supra note 3. 
21 Id. 
22 See Bierman & Collette, supra note 18. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See id. 
28 See CleanAir CABS Brochure, supra note 3. 
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picking up steam.”29 Cohen’s key point, however, was that Boston 
wanted to go with a perks and incentives approach to get companies 
and drivers to use hybrid cabs rather than simply mandate their use.30 
At the same time, Boston still expected results—more hybrid cabs on 
the streets.31 
2. The Mandate Approach 
 The CleanAir Cabs program was not as effective as city officials 
hoped.32 As a result, Boston changed its approach from offering incen-
tives for switching to simply mandating a switch to hybrid cabs.33 The 
mayor’s office announced the change on August 29, 2008.34 In addition 
to a fare hike and other rule changes, the new rules required the entire 
cab fleet to convert to hybrid vehicles by 2015, with the owners respon-
sible for the costs.35 The press release stated that the hybrid vehicles 
would be “phased in as the current vehicles reached their mandatory 
retirement age of six years.”36 Boston anticipated that 50% of the fleet 
would become hybrid within two years.37 
 Reactions to Boston’s decision were not all positive, especially 
amongst cab drivers.38 The negative reaction to the new mandate— 
similar to the negative reaction to the CleanAir Cabs program—was 
primarily due to the high costs of converting to hybrids.39 Owners, both 
companies and independent drivers, also complained about the cost of 
maintaining hybrid cabs, as the batteries allegedly wear out every few 
                                                                                                                      
29 Bierman & Collette, supra note 18. 
30 Id. 
31 See id. 
32 Compare CleanAir CABS Brochure, supra note 3 (illustrating Boston’s original ap-
proach), with Menino Press Release, supra note 4 (illustrating Boston’s switch to a mandate 
because of the original approach’s ineffectiveness). 
33 See Menino Press Release, supra note 4. 
34 Id. 
35 See id.; Meghna Chakrabarti, WBUR, Hybrid Mandate for Hub Cabbies, (2008) 
http://www.wbur.org/2008/09/17/hybrid-mandate-for-hub-cabbies. Police Commissioner 
Ed Davis said that the “announcement underscores our commitment to ensuring that Bos-
ton residents, members of the business community and our many tourists are provided 
with safe, clean and efficient taxi service. The implementation and strict enforcement of 
these improvements will significantly enhance our local taxi service and provide a more 
customer-friendly experience.” Menino Press Release, supra note 4. 
36 Menino Press Release, supra note 4. 
37 Id. 
38 See Dave Demerjian, Boston Cabbies Wicked Mad About Green Taxi Rule, ABC News, 
Sept. 4, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=5729177. 
39 See id. 
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years, costing owners an estimated $5000 per replacement battery.40 As 
Dave Demerjian pointed out in his piece for ABC News, “[r]equiring 
the Boston cab fleet to go all-hybrid is a great idea, but not if [it is] go-
ing to financially wipe out the people who drive th[e] fleet.”41 
II. New York City’s Hybrid Cab Regulations—Metropolitan 
Taxicab Board of Trade v. City of New York 
 New York City’s hybrid cab initiative took a different approach 
than Boston’s, by starting with a mandate instead of incentives.42 
Whereas Boston began with an incentive-based approach in the form of 
the CleanAir Cabs program, New York City’s Taxi and Limousine 
Commission (the “TLC”) promulgated rules creating a de facto man-
date for the adoption of hybrid cabs within a specified period of time.43 
The taxi industry subsequently challenged the regulations in Metropoli-
tan Taxicab Board of Trade v. City of New York.44 
A. The Regulations: Genesis and Challenge 
1. The TLC’s Regulations 
 The TLC has the authority to “regulate[] essentially all aspects of 
taxi operations and licensing.”45 As a result, Judge Crotty noted that 
“the TLC may set ‘[r]equirements of standards of safety, and design, 
comfort, convenience, noise and air pollution control and efficiency in 
the operation of vehicles and auxiliary equipment.’”46 
                                                                                                                      
40 See Boston’s Taxi Fleet to Go Hybrid by 2015, Boston Globe, Aug. 29, 2008, http:// 
www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2008/08/bostons_taxi_fl.html. The timeframe 
for battery replacement is a debated issue, as is the idea that the battery ever needs to be 
replaced at all. See Hybridcars.com, Behind the Hidden Costs of Hybrids, http://www. 
hybridcars.com/economics/hidden-costs.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). Evidence seems 
to support other electrical parts failing, rather than the battery itself, and the whole bat-
tery assembly is simply replaced anyway. See id. 
41 Demerjian, supra note 38. This negative reaction led to the taxi industry successfully 
challenging Boston’s mandate in court. See infra Part III.D. 
42 Compare CleanAir CABS Brochure, supra note 3 (describing Boston’s original in-
centives approach), with Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, Taxicab Specifications, New York, 
N.Y., R.C.N.Y. tit. 35, ch. 3, § 3-03(c)(10)–(11) (2009) (illustrating the miles-per-gallon 
mandate for New York City cabs). 
43 See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, No. 08 Civ. 7837 (PAC), 2008 WL 4866021, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008). 
44 See id. 
45 Id. The TLC was created in 1971 and is “governed by §§ 2300 et seq. of the New York 
City Charter, as well as by local laws passed by the New York City Council.” Id. 
46 Id. 
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 Using their broad authority to regulate the taxicab industry in New 
York City, the TLC enacted new rules that affected the minimum mile-
age-per-gallon requirements of new taxicabs in New York City.47 The 
new rules did not mandate hybrid cab adoption per se; however, Judge 
Crotty’s opinion in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I noted that this 
was its true effect: “While the . . . Rules [did] not state that the new 
taxis must have hybrid engines, the effect of the minimum mpg stan-
dard is that only cars with hybrid engines or clean diesel engines can 
meet the mileage standard requirement.”48 “Taxis have a mandatory 
retirement of three to five years, so, as a result of the new rule, essen-
tially all taxis in the city would be hybrids by 2012.”49 Additionally, 
“[m]ore than 90% of all taxis were Crown Victoria non-hybrid vehicles, 
which do not meet the mpg requirements under the . . . Rules.”50 The 
effect of the TLC’s regulations as a de facto mandate indicates they 
would force owners to upgrade the vast majority of the taxi fleet to 
more expensive vehicles.51 
2. The Parties and the Challenge 
 The conflict over mandating hybrid cab use was the central issue 
in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I and a large group of interested 
parties were plaintiffs in the case.52 “[A] full spectrum of the taxicab 
                                                                                                                      
47 Id.; see Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, Taxicab Specifications, New York, N.Y., R.C.N.Y. 
tit. 35, ch. 3, § 3-03(c)(10)–(11) (2009). The regulations state that: 
beginning October 1, 2008, no taxicab shall be hacked up unless the taxicab 
meets either the requirements of an accessible taxicab pursuant to section 3-
03.2 of this chapter or both of the following: (i) a minimum city rating of 
twenty-five (25) miles per gallon as labeled pursuant to title 49, section 32908 
of the United States Code and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, 
and (ii) the vehicle specifications provided in section 3-03.1(c) of this chap-
ter, whether or not the taxicab is a hybrid electric vehicle. 
Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, Taxicab Specifications, New York, N.Y., R.C.N.Y. tit. 35, ch. 3, 
§ 3-03(c)(10) (2009). The miles-per-gallon requirement is then increased for new vehicles 
after October 1, 2009, from twenty five miles-per-gallon to thirty miles-per-gallon. Id., § 3-
03(c)(11). 
48 Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *2. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. at *1. 
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industry, from owner, to driver, to end user” came together to chal-
lenge New York City’s hybrid cab regulations.53 
 As a result of their worries over the cost and scale of the conver-
sion, plaintiffs filed their complaint seeking an injunction against the 
regulations on September 8, 2008, alleging that the new rules were ex-
pressly and impliedly preempted by clauses in two federal laws: the En-
ergy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA)54 and the Federal 
Clean Air Act (CAA).55 To obtain their preliminary injunction, plain-
tiffs had to show that they were likely to suffer irreparable harm with-
out the requested relief as well as likelihood of success in proving the 
regulations were preempted.56 In other words, plaintiffs had to show 
that the TLC’s rules were likely preempted under either the EPCA or 
the CAA in order to be granted an injunction preventing the TLC’s 
rules from taking effect.57 
B. The Preemption Question in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I 
1. The Preemption Doctrine 
 The preemption doctrine was the true problem for the new rules 
promulgated by the TLC.58 The bulk of the court’s opinion focused on 
“the words of the TLC’s regulation and analyze[d] whether the regula-
tion, as written, [was] preempted by federal law.”59 As the court noted, 
questions of federal preemption begin with the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution which “‘invalidates state laws that inter-
fere with, or are contrary to, federal law.’”60 
 The preemption doctrine arises out of the Supremacy Clause of 
the Constitution, which concerns conflicts between state and federal 
laws.61 “In applying this doctrine, courts must determine Congressional 
intent in enacting the federal law and whether a state law actually con-
                                                                                                                      
53 Id. Among the plaintiffs were the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, an associa-
tion made up of several New York fleets, as well as Midtown Operating Corp., a private cab 
garage, an independent contractor, and a frequent cab passenger. Id. 
54 Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2006). 
55 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006). 
56 Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *3. 
57 See id. at *7. 
58 See id. at *15. 
59 Id. at *7. 
60 Id. (quoting Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 
712 (1985)). 
61 Gaynor & Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 816; Giovinazzo, supra note 1, at 911. 
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flicts with a federal law, and if so, to what extent is there a conflict.”62 
There are three general situations that give rise to federal preemption: 
(1) express preemption, (2) implied preemption, and (3) conflict pre-
emption.63 
 At issue in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I was express preemp-
tion, which applies where “Congress expressly states, in the legislation 
itself, that federal law trumps state laws.”64 “[B]oth the CAA and the 
EPCA contain express preemption clauses.”65 Christopher Giovinazzo66 
notes, however, that “as with any statutory language, preemption 
clauses are not always clear in their purpose or scope.”67 
 One of Giovinazzo’s relevant points is that “the [Supreme] Court’s 
move away from the presumption against preemption supports a 
broader reading of the EPCA’s preemption clause.”68 Without the pre-
sumption against preemption, the preemption clauses of the EPCA and 
CAA can be interpreted to cover more than a strict textual reading 
might suggest.69 Though Giovinazzo discussed extending the EPCA’s 
preemption clause to California’s greenhouse gas emissions regulations, 
the same analysis is relevant to the plaintiff’s claim in Metropolitan Taxi-
cab Board of Trade I: the CAA’s preemption clause can be extended to the 
TLC’s fuel economy regulations because they are related to emissions.70 
Because of the similarities, Giovinazzo’s analysis is valuable when exam-
ining the court’s findings in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I regard-
ing preemption of the TLC’s rules under the EPCA and CAA.71 
2. Preemption Under the EPCA 
 After a detailed analysis of the EPCA and a comparison to the 
TLC’s rules, the court in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I found the 
                                                                                                                      
62 Gaynor & Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 816. 
63 Giovinazzo, supra note 1, at 911. 
64 Gaynor & Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 816. 
65 Giovinazzo, supra note 1, at 911. 
66 Christopher Giovinazzo is an associate with the law firm of Bondurant, Mixon & El-
more L.L.P. BMELaw.com, Christopher Giovinazzo, http://www.bmelaw.com/attorneys/ 
Giovinazzo_Christopher.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). He graduated cum laude from Har-
vard Law School in 2004 and was Editor-in-Chief of the Harvard Environmental Affairs Law 
Review. Id. 
67 Giovinazzo, supra note 1, at 915. 
68 Id. at 918. 
69 See id. at 918, 920. 
70 See id. at 936–37; see also Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, No. 08 Civ. 7837(PAC), 2008 WL 
4866021 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) (holding EPCA preempts the TLC regulations). 
71 See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *7–15; Giovinazzo, supra, note 1 
at 915–37. 
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rules to be “most likely expressly preempted by the EPCA.”72 The court 
found the purpose of the EPCA to be “to improve motor vehicle effi-
ciency and to ‘decrease dependence on foreign [oil] imports, enhance 
national security, achieve the efficient utilization of scarce resources, 
and guarantee the availability of domestic energy supplies at prices 
consumers can afford.’”73 The court then went on to refute New York 
City’s arguments against preemption under the EPCA,74 and then dis-
cussed the likely lack of preemption by the CAA.75 
a. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie and the Pur-
pose Behind the EPCA 
 In its preemption analysis, the court relied heavily on Green Moun-
tain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie in interpreting the EPCA.76 
The EPCA has an express preemption clause: 
When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under 
this chapter . . . is in effect, a State or political subdivision of a 
State may not adopt or enforce a law or regulation related to 
fuel economy standards or average fuel economy standards 
for automobiles covered by an average fuel economy standard 
under this chapter.77 
The court in Green Mountain Chrysler noted that the term “related to” 
was problematic.78 “Related to” could encompass any regulation or law 
passed by a state that even touches upon fuel economy; therefore, in 
examining the meaning of the clause, the court must look at the objec-
tives of the statute.79 
 The court examined the intent behind the EPCA and made two 
precedential holdings about it.80 First, the court noted that “EPCA’s 
objectives [were] to conserve energy.”81 The court stated that “Title V 
was enacted to improve automotive efficiency by setting fuel economy 
                                                                                                                      
72 Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *12. 
73 Id. at *8 (quoting Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 
538 F.3d 1172, 1182 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
74 See id. at *10–12; infra Part II.B.2.b. 
75 See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *12–14; infra Part II.B.3. 
76 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 306 (D. Vt. 2007); see Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 
4866021, at *8–15. 
77 Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2006). 
78 See 508 F. Supp. 2d at 353. 
79 See id. at 353–54. 
80 See id. 
81 Id. 
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standards.”82 That said, “[a] state law that controlled or superseded a 
core EPCA function—to set fuel economy standards for automobiles— 
would appear to be preempted.”83 Second, the court noted that “Con-
gress’s undoubted intent was to make the setting of fuel economy stan-
dards exclusively a federal concern.”84 
 Both of these observations were relevant to the decision in Metro-
politan Taxicab Board of Trade I.85 The court in Green Mountain Chrysler 
held that the EPCA clearly preempts state regulations that set miles-per-
gallon requirements on the grounds that they are fuel economy stan-
dards and covered by the language of the preemption clause.86 This 
analysis from Green Mountain Chrysler was the main reason the court in 
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I found the TLC’s new fuel economy 
rules to be likely preempted under the EPCA.87 The court noted that 
“[a] fair reading of the . . . Rules lead[] to but one conclusion: the rules 
set standards that relate to an average number of miles that New York 
City taxicabs must travel per gallon of gasoline.”88 
b. New York City’s Arguments Against Preemption 
 New York City asserted two primary reasons why the EPCA might 
not preempt the TLC’s rules.89 First, New York City argued that the 
rules do not “relate to” fuel economy standards because they “do not 
interfere with the objectives of the EPCA.”90 Second, the city argued 
that the rules are exempted by an “own use” savings clause and the fact 
that New York was a market participant under the “market participant 
doctrine” as opposed to a market regulator.91 The court did not accept 
either argument.92 
 The court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Engine Manu-
facturers Ass’n v. Coast Air Quality Management District in refuting the de-
                                                                                                                      
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 354. 
85 Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, No. 08 Civ. 7837(PAC), 2008 WL 4866021, at *8–15 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008). 
86 See 508 F. Supp. 2d at 354. 
87 See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *8–9. 
88 Id. at *9. 
89 See id. at *10. 
90 Id. 
91 Id.; see Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 49 U.S.C. § 32919(c) (2006) 
(the savings clause). 
92 See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *10–12. 
168 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 37:157 
fendants’ first argument.93 In that case, the Supreme Court rejected an 
argument that under the CAA the term “standard” must be defined 
narrowly to prevent preemption from being overbroad.94 Instead, the 
Supreme Court held that “if one State or political subdivision may en-
act such rules, then so may any other; and the end result would undo 
Congress’s carefully calibrated regulatory scheme.”95 The court in Met-
ropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I noted the reasoning from Engine Manu-
facturers Ass’n before refuting the city’s claim that “federal jurispru-
dence [was] moving toward an interpretation of the term ‘related to’ in 
preemption cases as meaning ‘actually interfering with’ the relevant 
federal regulation.”96 That conclusion, in turn, led the court to con-
clude that “the [d]efendants’ argument that ‘related to’ means actually 
‘affecting’ or ‘interfering’” was erroneous.97 
 The court in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I also refuted New 
York City’s second argument against preemption: that the new fuel 
economy rules were exempted under an “own use” savings clause in the 
EPCA and that New York City was a market participant.98 New York City 
claimed both that taxis were an integral part of the public transit sys-
tem, and also that through regulation, New York City was a market par-
ticipant.99 The court rejected these arguments as “tortur[ing] both lan-
guage and logic.”100 
 The court referred to Building & Construction Trades Council v. Asso-
ciated Builders & Contractors, Inc. for an analysis of the market partici-
pant doctrine and why it was not applicable to New York City in Metro-
politan Taxicab Board of Trade I.101 In addition, the court in Metropolitan 
Taxicab Board of Trade I noted that, likewise, in Engine Manufactures Ass’n, 
“the Ninth Circuit held that the market participant doctrine allowed 
                                                                                                                      
93 See 541 U.S. 246, 248–49, 253–55 (2004); Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 
4866021, at *10–12. 
94 See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 541 U.S. at 254. 
95 Id. at 255; Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *10. 
96 Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *10; see Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc., 128 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1997). 
97 See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *10. 
98 See id. The savings clause is found in § 32919(c) and states that “[a] State or a political 
subdivision of a State may prescribe requirements for fuel economy for automobiles obtained 
for its own use.” Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 49 U.S.C. § 32919(c) (2006). 
99 Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *10. 
100 Id. 
101 See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., 507 
U.S. 218 (1993); Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *7. 
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state and local government entities ‘to use their own money to acquire 
or use vehicles that exceed the federal standards.’”102 
 The court in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I decided that the 
market participant doctrine did not apply to New York City because of 
the nature of the city’s involvement in the taxi industry.103 The market 
participant doctrine applies to a state or agency acting directly in the 
market, which includes setting regulations for its own vehicles.104 How-
ever, a state is not a market participant where it is acting as a market 
regulator of an industry.105 The court noted that “[t]he TLC’s rules 
appl[ied] to all privately owned, licensed yellow taxicabs in New York 
City, while the fleet restrictions that the Ninth Circuit allowed in Engine 
Manufacturers Ass’n applied only to vehicles procured by state and local 
government entities for their own use.”106 Because the city Charter it-
self created the TLC as a market regulator, the court in Metropolitan 
Taxicab Board of Trade I also did not accept the argument that the city’s 
“role as gatekeeper into the taxicab business somehow [made] the TLC 
a market participant.”107 The court referred to the New York City Char-
ter, which established the TLC, to show that the charter literally makes 
the TLC a regulator and not a participant.108 
 Finally, the court in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I rejected 
New York City’s “own use” argument for similar reasons, noting that 
“[t]he rules regulating private taxicab acquisition and use [were] mate-
rially and substantially different than the city’s conduct when it 
[bought] the tens of thousands of police cars or other vehicles for the 
wide variety of fleets that the city owns, operates, and maintains.”109 
When the city buys vehicles for its own use, it takes title to them and 
pays for them.110 In contrast, while the court notes that taxis are part of 
                                                                                                                      
102 Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *10 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d 1031, 1043 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
103 See id. at *10–11. 
104 See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 498 F.3d at 1043; Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 
4866021, at *10. 
105 See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 498 F.3d at 1043; Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 
4866021, at *10. 
106 Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *11. 
107 Id.; see N.Y.C. Charter, § 2300 (2004), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/char- 
ter/downloads/pdf/citycharter2004.pdf. 
108 See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *11. Section 2303(a) of the 
Charter states: “[t]he jurisdiction, powers and duties of the commission shall include the 
regulation and supervision of the business and industry of transportation of persons by 
licensed vehicles for hire in the city, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.” N.Y.C. 
Charter, § 2303(a) (2004). 
109 Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *11. 
110 Id. 
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the public transit system, it makes clear that they are intended for pri-
vate ownership and are not the city’s property.111 
 The court found that the new TLC rules effectively mandating hy-
brid cab use in NYC were likely to be expressly preempted under Sec-
tion 32919(a) of the EPCA, declaring that the “Defendants’ counter-
arguments . . . [were] unconvincing. . . . [And] plaintiffs [had] shown a 
likelihood of success on the merits.”112 
3. Preemption Under the CAA 
 The plaintiffs in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I also made the 
argument that the CAA preempted TLC’s new miles-per-gallon rules 
for New York City taxicabs.113 The preemption provision itself reads as 
follows: 
No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or at-
tempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emis-
sions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle en-
gines . . . . No State shall require certification, inspection, or 
any other approval relating to the control of emissions from 
any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as condi-
tion precedent to the initial retail sale, titling . . . or registra-
tion of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equip-
ment.114 
The preemption clause would not seem to apply to the TLC regulations 
because they only regulated fuel economy and not emissions.115 How-
ever, the court noted that the plaintiffs argued the “Rules—which gov-
ern fuel economy—[were] a de facto regulation of emissions and that 
the purpose [was] to regulate emissions.”116 Phrasing the argument 
that way made the issue one of “whether plaintiffs ha[d] a likelihood of 
success in demonstrating that TLC regulations imposing fuel economy 
standards [were] preempted by the CAA when the regulations at issue 
do not mention or target emissions.”117 The court ruled that the plain-
tiffs did not have a likelihood of success and that there was likely no 
                                                                                                                      
111 Id. 
112 See id. at *12. 
113 See id. at *12–14. 
114 Id. at *12 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006)). 
115 Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, Taxicab Specifications, New York, N.Y., R.C.N.Y. tit. 35, 
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chance of preemption under the CAA.118 The court quickly acknowl-
edged that “[a] state or municipal law that clearly targets emissions in 
new vehicles is generally preempted under the CAA.”119 The court 
noted two cases that dealt with an issue very similar to the plaintiffs’ 
assertion of preemption under the CAA: Green Mountain Chrysler and 
Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene.120 
 Green Mountain Chrysler dealt with the possibility that regulation of 
greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles under a state’s regulation 
based on the CAA would be preempted by the EPCA.121 In other words, 
there might be an actual conflict between the EPCA and the CAA 
where preemption is concerned, due to overlap.122 In that case, the 
court stated that “[t]he legislative history of EPCA and the CAA, and 
the agencies’ practices, demonstrate[d] that there [was] no inherent 
conflict between the mandate of the CAA to regulate air pollution and 
the mandate of EPCA to regulate fuel economy.”123 
 The court in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I noted the finding 
in Green Mountain Chrysler of no inherent conflict due to the fact there 
was no evidence that the “emissions rule was a de facto fuel economy 
standard because the evidence in that case showed that ‘compliance 
with the regulation [was] not achieved solely by improving a fleet’s fuel 
economy.’”124 The court also noted that in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 
Inc., the EPCA preempted “only those state regulations that [were] ex-
plicitly aimed at the establishment of fuel economy standards, or that 
[were] the de facto equivalent of mileage regulation . . . .”125 
 Both Green Mountain Chrysler and Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. 
dealt with the possibility of EPCA preempting emissions regulations 
because they related to fuel economy,126 but the court in Metropolitan 
Taxicab Board of Trade I applied these two cases to a different set of 
                                                                                                                      
118 See id. at *14. 
119 Id. at *13. 
120 Id.; see Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1175 
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122 See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *13. 
123 Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 356. 
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Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 352–53). 
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facts.127 Plaintiff’s argument here stated that the TLC’s regulations gov-
erning fuel-economy standards were preempted under the CAA be-
cause they related to emissions.128 “[B]oth Green Mountain and Central 
Valley make clear that the preemption provisions of the EPCA and the 
CAA relate specifically to their defined categories—fuel economy and 
emission regulation, respectively—and while they may overlap, they do 
not conflict.”129 Given this lack of inherent conflict between the EPCA 
and CAA, the court found it unlikely that the TLC’s rules were pre-
empted under the CAA because they did not relate to the control of 
emissions.130 The court relied on New York City’s stated purpose for the 
regulations in reaching this conclusion.131 
 Even without finding a likelihood of preemption under the CAA, 
the court’s finding of a likelihood of preemption under the EPCA satis-
fied the likelihood of success on the merits standard, and the court 
awarded plaintiffs the preliminary injunction to prevent the TLC’s 
regulations from going into effect.132 The end result derailed New York 
City’s attempt to force the city’s taxicab industry to transition to hybrid 
cabs.133 
C. New York City’s Response: A Switch to Incentives and a Push  
Against the EPCA 
1. New York City Chooses Incentives 
 As a result of the decision in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I, 
New York City changed its tactics to an incentive-based approach to get 
its taxi fleets to use hybrid vehicles.134 Boston tried this approach al-
ready, and it failed to accomplish the city’s goals of speeding up the 
adoption of hybrid cabs.135 In a press release on November 14, 2008, 
New York City announced it would not appeal the decision in Metropoli-
                                                                                                                      
127 See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade I, 2008 WL 4866021, at *14. 
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tan Taxicab Board of Trade I.136 Instead, Mayor Bloomberg “announced a 
series of initiatives to increase the use of fuel efficient and environmen-
tally friendly taxicabs, through new financial incentives and legislative 
incentives.”137 New York City thinks 
[t]he incentive program will allow fleet owners to increase the 
lease cap fee charged to drivers in fuel efficient vehicles by $3 
per shift, which will offset the increased cost of purchasing a 
fuel efficient vehicle. The driver, while paying the increased 
lease cap fee, will still see significant savings due to the re-
duced fuel costs, which he or she pays. Taxicab drivers in fuel 
efficient vehicles achieve an average fuel savings of at least $15 
per shift, which adds up to about $5,000 a year.138 
In addition, to “further incentivize the use of fuel efficient taxicabs, the 
TLC [would] propose to decrease the lease cap fee an owner can charge 
a driver by $12 per shift if the vehicle is a Crown Victoria or another 
non-fuel efficient vehicle, costing fleet owners approximately $8,500 per 
year, per vehicle.”139 
2. The Push to Alter the EPCA 
 Several politicians expressed frustration with the decision and 
status of the law, and suggested other solutions besides a change in the 
regulations.140 Mayor Bloomberg called the law “archaic,” claiming that 
“we hit a speed bump in our efforts to turn New York City’s yellow cabs 
green[,] . . . preventing us from reducing greenhouse gases and im-
proving air quality.”141 Meanwhile, Congressman Jerrold Nadler stated 
that 
[t]he recent federal court decision to block the greening of 
New York City’s taxis [was] not in keeping with the original 
spirit of federal environmental legislation. . . . Fuel efficient 
taxis don’t simply represent a pie-in-the-sky futuristic luxury 
                                                                                                                      
136 Hybrid Cab Press Release, supra note 134. 
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for New Yorkers but a present-day necessity which will pro-
duce a meaningful reduction in our city’s carbon emissions.142 
In addition, Richard Kassel of the Natural Resources Defense Council 
argued that “[it was] time for Washington to update its rules so that the 
[c]ity’s hybrid taxi program [could] move forward.”143 Because of the 
frustration, the city will also pursue a campaign to amend the EPCA, 
spearheaded by Congressman Nadler.144 
III. New York City’s Program in the Larger Context of the 
Debate over Environmental Federalism and  
Repercussions for Boston 
A. State and Local Leadership in Innovative Environmental Policy 
 The decision in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I and New York 
City’s response are part of a larger debate over who should take the ini-
tiative in regulation of environmental concerns such as fuel economy 
and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: the federal government or state 
and local governments.145 The need for preemption and federal regu-
lation of environmental concerns is often expressed as an argument 
that “absent national standards, states will engage in a ‘race to the bot-
tom.’”146 However, Giovinazzo argues that since the 1990s, “state and 
local governments, not Congress and the President, have led the nation 
in innovative environmental policy.”147 Giovinazzo and others think 
that the increasing numbers of state and local government initiatives 
are the result of “glaring inaction at the federal level.”148 Giovinazzo 
notes that “[s]ince vehicular . . . emissions are directly related to fuel 
economy, mobile GHGs are particularly intractable so long as fuel 
economy remains on the decline.”149 Giovinazzo examines several state 
and local government initiatives in the area of GHG regulation, and 
argues that willingness to deal with the issues of fuel economy and 




145 See generally Adelman & Engel, supra note 1 (proposing a system of adaptive federal-
ism to facilitate state and local regulation); Gaynor & Zimmerman, supra note 2 (discuss-
ing federal preemption of state climate change laws); Parenteau, supra note 1 (discussing 
state vs. federal climate change initiatives). 
146 Giovinazzo, supra note 1, at 907. 
147 Id. 
148 Id.; see Parenteau, supra note 1, at 1455. 
149 Giovinazzo, supra note 1, at 908–09. 
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GHG emissions in the face of inaction by the federal government re-
sults in preemption issues such as those in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of 
Trade I.150 
B. California’s Attempt to Control Vehicle GHG Emissions: AB-1493 
 The conflict over New York City’s hybrid cab regulations was one 
of the more recent and one of the more high profile examples of pre-
emption arising in the context of state and local regulation of fuel 
economy and emissions issues, but there are several others.151 Another 
example was California’s attempt to regulate GHG emissions through 
Assembly Bill 1493 (AB-1493).152 
 Whereas Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I dealt with federal pre-
emption of local miles-per-gallon rules, California’s AB-1493 attempted 
to control tailpipe GHG emissions through motor vehicle regulations, 
leading to some of the same preemption issues argued in Metropolitan 
Taxicab Board of Trade I.153 In fact, the court in Metropolitan Taxicab Board 
of Trade I discussed in detail the two major cases relating to AB-1493: 
Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie and Central Valley 
Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene.154 
 AB-1493, passed in 2002, “aim[ed] to reduce GHG emissions from 
the tailpipes of passenger cars and light-duty trucks by 30% by 2016, 
beginning in the model year car 2009.”155 The California Air Resources 
Board (CARB) adopted the regulations in September of 2004.156 By 
2007, sixteen other states had either taken steps to implement Califor-
nia’s regulations or “indicated an attempt to do the same.”157 California 
is the only state allowed to set stricter emissions standards than the fed-
eral government under the CAA, but other states are allowed to adopt 
California’s standards once the EPA has approved them.158 
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1. Challenges to AB-1493 in Vermont and California 
 Green Mountain Chrysler and Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. were 
both the result of CAA and EPCA preemption challenges to implemen-
tations of California’s regulations.159 Green Mountain Chrysler arose when 
automakers and dealers challenged the implementation of California’s 
regulations in Vermont.160 In challenging the regulations, opponents 
asserted that the regulations were preempted not only by the CAA, but 
by the EPCA even though the laws regulated emissions and not fuel 
economy directly.161 The same issues arose again when opponents 
brought similar challenges in California.162 The decision in Central Val-
ley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. was “handed down . . . two months after the deci-
sion in Vermont.”163 
 Both Green Mountain Chrysler and Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc., 
resulted in favorable decisions for states following California’s lead in 
non-federal regulation of vehicle economy and emissions.164 However, 
the issue was originally unresolved because California—and the states 
attempting to adopt its standards—had to wait on approval from the 
EPA.165 This need for EPA approval was due to the fact that “[u]nder 
the Clean Air Act, which generally preempts an individual state’s regu-
lation of motor vehicle emissions, California [was] required to seek a 
waiver from the EPA to set standards stricter than national emissions 
levels.”166 EPA’s denial of California’s waiver request on December 19, 
2007 originally stalled both California’s plan and its adoption by other 
states.167 However, President Obama directed the EPA to reconsider the 
waiver, which was rejected at the end of the previous administration.168 
On July 30, 2009, after reconsideration of California’s request, EPA an-
nounced it was granting California’s waiver, allowing the state to move 
forward.169 
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C. Context: The Future of Environmental Preemption Issues 
 California’s AB-1493 and the resulting litigation are relevant to the 
decision in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I for two reasons. First, 
they provide much of the precedent used in the decision’s preemption 
analysis.170 Second, they help put Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I 
and hybrid cab programs in the context of the greater debate over who 
should take the lead in environmental regulation—the states and local 
governments or the federal government.171 
 Several authors have analyzed AB-1493 in light of its relevance to 
environmental federalism.172 Gaynor and Zimmerman believe that ex-
isting preemption issues are likely to become more noticeable in the 
future.173 They argue that “[w]ith so many state climate change pro-
grams already in existence, any future federal climate change legisla-
tion will most likely cause preemption issues.”174 While they are primar-
ily concerned about programs like AB-1493, the court made clear in 
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I that the same preemption issues 
that apply to attempts to control GHG emissions also apply to attempts 
to set fuel-economy standards.175 
 Parenteau lauds attempts by states and local governments to be 
more progressive than the federal government, but thinks that the fed-
eral government will have to take final responsibility.176 In his analysis, 
plans such as California’s and New York City’s are good ideas, but they 
are not enough.177 
 Giovinazzo argues that the preemption doctrine should be clari-
fied and adapted in such a way that makes cases like California’s possi-
ble.178 Giovinazzo argues for a very loose interpretation of the EPCA 
regarding AB-1493 because congressional intent with regard to the 
scope of preemption is unclear.179 Giovinazzo feels that preemption 
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should be constrained when “the purpose behind preemption would 
be poorly served, and where the history of state innovation is both suc-
cessful and important.”180 Thus, he sympathizes with state and local at-
tempts to handle pressing environmental issues progressively.181 
 David E. Adelman and Kirsten H. Engel decry what they see as the 
rising tide of preemptive federal environmental legislation.182 They sup-
port the idea of a dynamic, interwoven system of federal and state envi-
ronmental jurisdiction.183 Specifically, they favor an “adaptive model . . . 
premised on the parallel development of environmental policies at mul-
tiple levels of government.”184 Such a model would allow for diversity in 
regulation based on the interests of individual states, such as California, 
and individual local governments, such as New York City.185 The goal of 
such a model is to limit the ability of federal dominance to crush local 
diversity in policy and innovation.186 Adelman and Engel make the 
point that “[t]he single most important means of fostering adaptive fed-
eralism is restricting federal regulatory preemption.”187 
D. The Failure of Boston’s Mandate Approach and Further  
Problems for New York City 
 New York City was not the only metropolitan area to have its hy-
brid cab mandate struck down based on preemption under the EPCA; 
Boston faced a similar fate.188 As discussed previously, Boston adopted a 
mandate approach to transition cabs over to hybrids after the city’s in-
centive-based approach failed to meet expectations.189 Boston’s new 
mandate required vehicles put into service as a taxi after August 29, 
2008 to be a new Clean Taxi vehicle.190 The mandate defined Clean 
Taxi as coming from a list of approved vehicles, which contained only 
current model year hybrid vehicles.191 
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 Subsequently, cab owners and the Boston Taxi Owners Association 
filed suit to prevent the enforcement of the hybrid cab mandate. U.S. 
District Judge William G. Young granted a request for a temporary in-
junction to halt implementation of the plan after Boston declined to do 
so voluntarily.192 
 On August 14, 2009, Judge Young ruled that Boston’s hybrid cab 
mandate, contained in Boston Police Department Rule 403, was ex-
pressly preempted by the EPCA, and he permanently enjoined Boston 
from enforcing it.193 In deciding the case, Judge Young relied heavily 
on a discussion of Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I.194 He discussed 
that decision’s reliance on Engine Manufacturer’s Ass’n and noted the 
problem of many cities following New York’s example, including the 
creation of an unwanted aggregate effect.195 Judge Young clearly indi-
cated that he found Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I “persuasive and 
well-reasoned.”196 
 Judge Young also relied on a second New York case challenging 
the city of New York’s regulatory response to Metropolitan Taxicab Board 
of Trade I.197 In the wake of its loss, New York City “pursued an alternate 
strategy: it promulgated a second set of regulations promoting the pur-
chase of hybrid taxis by reducing the rates at which taxicab owners 
could lease non-hybrid vehicles to drivers.”198 Essentially, under New 
York City’s new incentives approach, 
if an owner purchase[d] a taxicab with a hybrid or clean-diesel 
engine . . . the rate at which the vehicle [could] be leased to a 
driver for a 12-hour shift [was] increased by $3. By contrast, if 
an owner lease[d] out a non-hybrid, non-wheelchair accessible 
vehicle (i.e., a Crown Victoria), the maximum lease rate an 
owner may charge a driver [was] reduced by $4 immediately 
. . . .199 
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade II concerned the plaintiffs’ claims 
that these new regulations were in fact a de facto mandate on the plain-
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tiffs to purchase hybrid cabs, just like the previous regulations based on 
fuel economy.200 The court agreed.201 
 The court also held that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of suc-
cess in demonstrating that the EPCA preempted the new incentives.202 
The court noted that “[i]n this case, while it is true that the Lease Cap 
Rules do not require a specific mpg rating, the effect of the rules is to 
force taxicab owners to meet an mpg threshold determined by the 
mileage rating of the TLC’s approved hybrid or clean diesel vehi-
cles.”203 Because of this, the court held that the rules related to fuel 
economy even though they were not mpg specific like the previous 
mandate: “The 25/30 Rules specifically referred to mpg standards, but 
creative drafting and the absence of specific reference to mileage [did] 
not make the effect—or the purpose—of the Lease Cab Rules any dif-
ferent than the prior preempted regulations.”204 Therefore, the court 
held that the rules were “related to” fuel economy standards within the 
meaning of the EPCA and were likely preempted.205 
 Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I and Metropolitan Taxicab Board of 
Trade II were not the only authorities that Judge Young relied on in his 
decision regarding Boston’s hybrid cab mandate.206 He also considered 
an article in the Harvard Law Review on Metropolitan Taxicab Board of 
Trade I, that agreed with Judge Crotty’s opinion that “related to” does 
not require “actual interference with” to be correct.207 
 Because of this, Boston’s hybrid cab mandate ended in the same 
manner as did New York’s, and Judge Young’s decision built upon 
Judge Crotty’s two decisions from both New York cases. However, it is 
worth noting that Judge Young actually cited Adelman and Engel’s cri-
tique of the sweeping expanse of federal preemption; however, despite 
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this statement of sympathy, he felt that “in this case, it is a local gov-
ernment that has overstepped its bounds.”208 
IV. Moving Forward: New York City’s Hybrid Cab Program and 
Progressive Local Environmental Regulation in the Wake  
of the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade Cases 
 Hybrid cab programs appear to be very important to the metro-
politan areas that have attempted to implement them.209 The frustra-
tion of New York City’s officials with the decision in Metropolitan Taxicab 
Board of Trade I is both palpable and understandable because there are 
benefits tied to New York and other cities’ attempts to mandate hybrid 
cabs.210 These benefits include reduced fuel costs and more efficient 
vehicles.211 In addition to the environmental benefits, regulations like 
New York City’s serve a similar purpose to those concerning GHG emis-
sions in California, and are an example of state and local governments 
reacting to what they consider to be inadequate federal law.212 
 As a result of the decision, New York City focused on an incentive-
based plan instead, as well as a campaign to amend the EPCA, but per-
haps a stronger statement is needed.213 This is especially true given that 
the district court rejected the disincentives in New York City’s new regu-
lations enacted after Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I.214 New York 
City should (1) take into account problems with other incentive plans 
and examine other options in structuring its hybrid cab program in 
order to identify the most effective method that will not run afoul of 
the EPCA in its current form;215 and (2) push harder to have the EPCA 
amended because changing it is an important element in the context 
of environmental federalism.216 
A. New York’s Response to the Decision: Why Incentives Are Not Enough 
 New York City decided to adopt an incentives approach to encour-
age hybrid cab use in the wake of Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I, 
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but there are problems with this approach and it is not likely to en-
courage the widespread adoption of hybrid cabs, especially given the 
failure of the first incentive/disincentive structure adopted after the 
mandate was struck down.217 For one, Boston encountered problems 
with a similar approach.218 Boston tried the incentives approach with its 
CleanAir Cabs program and the program was unsuccessful.219 Boston’s 
series of grants to offset costs and special privileges at Logan Airport 
were designed to induce owners to replace Crown Victorias with hybrid 
vehicles by reducing the costs of the transition to the cleaner vehi-
cles.220 After not seeing the results they wanted, Boston decided to sim-
ply force the change.221 
 It is possible that New York City is not going to succeed in its goals 
by using an incentive-based approach, given Boston’s disappointing 
experience with an incentive-based program.222 New York City’s pro-
gram of incentives to get owners to switch voluntarily is slightly differ-
ent from Boston’s, in that it focuses more on the owners of cabs and 
less on the drivers.223 
 The rhetoric of the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade suggests 
that New York City’s incentives approach will not be effective.224 The 
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade does not like New York City’s new 
incentives and disincentives plan.225 In addition to claiming that hybrid 
vehicles have not been sufficiently time-tested to show that they are vi-
able for use as cabs, the board “dismissed the new financial incentives 
as an ‘end run’” around the ruling in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade 
I.226 Ron Sherman, the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade’s presi-
dent, claimed that the “attempt to buy off taxi operators and to use 
backdoor methods to force safe, proven commercial vehicles off the 
road [was] wrong and highly challengeable.”227 
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 If New York City is serious about an incentive-based approach to 
getting hybrid cabs on the streets, then it should consider more com-
prehensive options in order to overcome the taxi industry’s reluc-
tance.228 Rather than crafting a program so strict it is a de facto man-
date, New York City could cover more of the cost of the switch by 
providing grants, which is an idea Boston tried.229 New York City could 
direct those grants towards reducing the cost associated with outfitting 
new hybrids for use as cabs.230 More comprehensive incentives would 
help overcome the resistance of cab owners who are the parties that 
must ultimately be convinced if New York City’s plan is to be success-
ful.231 The point is that since Boston’s approach was not a success,232 
and neither was New York City’s first attempt after Metropolitan Taxicab 
Board of Trade I,233 New York City must go farther to convince owners to 
switch by using incentives, which may not be the best option.234 
B. Away from Incentives: Looking at Other Options 
1. The Possibility of Appeal 
 New York City has other options that may be better than an incen-
tive-based approach. Appealing the case was a possibility, but New York 
City decided against this course of action.235 The reason for this is 
sound: the court’s reasoning in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I re-
garding preemption under the EPCA came from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie.236 In 
Green Mountain Chrysler, the Supreme Court clearly stated that a state 
law or regulation superseding a core EPCA function—setting fuel 
economy standards—is most likely preempted.237 The Court also held 
that regulations that set miles-per-gallon requirements would be pre-
empted under the EPCA because they are fuel economy standards and 
covered by the language of the preemption clause.238 Given the clarity 
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of the Supreme Court’s analysis, an appeal would not survive unless the 
Supreme Court changes its stance on preemption under the EPCA.239 
 The failure of Boston’s hybrid cab mandate and the failure of New 
York City’s subsequent regulations also indicate that appeal would not 
have been the best option, as Judge Young adopted the reasoning of 
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I in Ophir, reinforcing its reason-
ing.240 Both Ophir and Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade II seem to in-
dicate that any attempt to mandate hybrid cab use will be unsuccessful, 
and an appeal on New York’s part would probably have failed.241 
2. Restructuring the TLC Regulations 
 New York City could also try to restructure its regulations to man-
date hybrid cab use without running afoul of the preemption clauses of 
the CAA and the EPCA.242 The decisions in Ophir and Metropolitan Taxi-
cab Board of Trade II, however, indicate that this might be impossible.243 
Boston’s mandate did not mention miles-per-gallon requirements at all, 
and yet was found likely to be preempted.244 Even New York City’s new 
incentive approach, which they chose instead of appealing, was struck 
down as likely preempted and a de facto mandate in Metropolitan Taxi-
cab Board of Trade II.245 Given the decision in Metropolitan Taxicab Board 
of Trade I, and the subsequent cases, Boston and New York City cannot 
word their regulations by directly setting miles-per-gallon require-
ments.246 Any regulations that set miles-per-gallon requirements are 
clearly preempted by the EPCA, because they are fuel economy stan-
dards and covered by the language of its preemption clause.247 New 
York City and Boston have already attempted this and failed.248 
 New York City could also reword a mandate to control vehicle 
emissions for cabs rather than fuel economy standards, but this is likely 
to result in a preemption challenge under the CAA of the kind raised 
against AB-1493.249 As opposed to the form of the regulation in TLC 
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Rule § 3-03(c)(10)–(11),250 the regulation could require a lower level 
of GHG emissions or other gas emissions in such a way as to mandate a 
switch to hybrid cabs. However, such an approach would likely raise a 
preemption challenge under the CAA’s preemption clause because it 
would directly affect emissions.251 Both Metropolitan Taxicab Board of 
Trade I and Green Mountain Chrysler indicate that just as a regulation di-
rectly affecting fuel economy is preempted by the EPCA, a regulation 
directly affecting emissions is preempted by the CAA.252 As the preemp-
tion challenge would likely be successful, New York City might want to 
choose a different approach, such as simply ordering the use of certain 
approved vehicles.253 
 The failure of New York City’s mandate—as well as its subsequent 
mandate-like incentives approach—and the failure of Boston’s mandate, 
together indicate that any attempt to mandate hybrid cab use without 
changing the EPCA is most likely impossible.254 Furthermore, the loose 
incentive approach Boston tried originally did not achieve the desired 
results.255 This makes New York City’s push to amend the EPCA in the 
wake of Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I all the more important.256 
3. The Importance of New York City’s Push to Alter the EPCA in the 
Context of the Debate over Environmental Federalism 
 New York City is also pushing to have the EPCA amended to allow 
cities to set fuel economy for their taxi fleets.257 This is one of the city’s 
most important responses to Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I be-
cause it establishes it  as a leader in the push towards progressive envi-
ronmental policy at the local level.258 One can argue that cities such as 
New York and Boston are “[leading] the nation in innovative environ-
mental policy.”259 The TLC regulations found unworkable in Metropoli-
tan Taxicab Board of Trade I appear to be part of a trend toward local 
progressiveness in environmental regulation.260 
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a. Similarities Between AB-1493 and New York City’s Hybrid Cab Man-
date 
 AB-1493 and New York City’s TLC regulations are in some ways 
similar and the challenges against both are the results of preemption 
clauses of federal statutes261 that block state and local governments 
from enacting regulations that are stronger than those enacted by the 
federal government.262 Granted, there are differences: AB-1493 was 
challenged for its setting of emissions requirements, not fuel-economy 
standards.263 In contrast, New York City’s TLC regulations were chal-
lenged for setting miles-per-gallon requirements, which were found 
likely preempted under the EPCA.264 The preemption challenges to 
AB-1493 failed, whereas the challenge to the TLC regulations suc-
ceeded.265 Both efforts—California’s and New York City’s—are illustra-
tive of some of the problems with preemption that Giovinazzo and oth-
ers have discussed.266 
 The views of several commentators discussed previously support 
New York City’s push to have the EPCA amended.267 Most of the com-
mentators have focused on AB-1493 when analyzing the problems 
posed by federal preemption.268 New York City’s TLC regulations and 
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I may also illustrate the trend towards 
progressive state and local regulation, providing yet another context for 
the intensifying debate over federal preemption of such state and local 
policies.269 
b. Away from the Race to the Bottom 
 Both AB-1493 in California and New York City’s TLC regulations 
represent a trend opposite of what Christopher Giovinazzo referred to 
as the race to the bottom, which is the supposed phenomenon that ab-
sent federal standards the states will lower environmental regulations 
instead of tighten them.270 AB-1493 was the strongest example he of-
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fered to dispute the race to the bottom argument.271 However, New 
York City’s TLC regulations are an example that one can put forward to 
dispute the existence of a race to the bottom. The TLC designed the 
regulations to mandate hybrid cabs to institute more stringent stan-
dards than federal law.272 The two sets of regulations indicate a trend 
that is the opposite of the race to the bottom in that state and local 
governments are implementing more stringent, rather than less strin-
gent, regulations.273 New York City’s desire to amend the EPCA in the 
wake of Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade I also represents a trend op-
posite of the race to the bottom.274 New York City makes an argument 
similar to Giovinazzo’s in support of its push to amend the EPCA: that 
the purpose behind preemption is poorly served in this case, and that 
they are pushing for local innovation that would be both successful and 
important.275 
c. Current Versus Future Regulations and the Need for Strong Federal 
Policy: Where New York’s Regulations and the Push to Amend the 
EPCA Fit 
 Gaynor and Zimmerman argue that preemption issues are likely to 
get worse as time goes on, but the conflict in Metropolitan Taxicab Board 
of Trade I is a slightly different phenomenon.276 Gaynor and Zimmer-
man discuss programs like AB-1493 in the context of the passage of new 
federal environmental laws, and they are worried that those laws may 
conflict with existing state laws and local ordinances.277 In Metropolitan 
Taxicab Board of Trade I, the problem did not arise because of new fed-
eral law but because of new, innovative local laws. Local laws raised pre-
emption issues because they attempted to supersede federal law by en-
acting more stringent regulations.278 
 Patrick Parenteau lauds state and local initiatives that are progres-
sive in ways federal law is not, but argues that there is a need for a 
strong federal policy to take their place eventually.279 Strong federal 
initiative might work best in the context of countrywide GHG emis-
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sions, and might be more effective than states like California setting 
their own, especially if the federal program is sufficiently strict. How-
ever, such a strategy seems to leave out situations like New York City’s. 
Certainly New York City is interested in reducing GHG emissions,280 but 
its attempt is highly localized and is not on the same scale as Califor-
nia’s efforts.281 
 Looking at all the commentators, one might conclude that the 
EPCA should either be changed or reinterpreted so it no longer pre-
empts small scale programs such as New York City’s.282 Giovinazzo 
would likely condone such an option. He argues that preemption 
should be constrained in situations where “the purpose behind pre-
emption would be poorly served, and where the history of state innova-
tion is both successful and important.”283 While New York City’s hybrid 
taxi program is not a state program on the scale of California’s, it is im-
portant to the city’s residents.284 The express language of the EPCA’s 
preemption clause barred New York City’s regulations because they set 
miles-per-gallon requirements.285 Congress intended the EPCA to apply 
on a large scale to prevent states from setting different miles-per-gallon 
requirements for all vehicles, thereby forcing manufacturers to meet 
different standards in each state.286 Because New York City’s hybrid cab 
requirements involved existing vehicles and did not require manufac-
turers to satisfy a wide array of miles-per-gallon requirements, it may 
not fall within the scope of congressional intent.287 
 David E. Adelman and Kristen H. Engel provide a model for 
amending the EPCA that would allow local initiatives such as New York 
City’s.288 Adelman and Engel’s model of adaptive federalism—the goal 
of which is to limit the ability of federal dominance to crush local diver-
sity in policy and innovation—may be applicable in this scenario.289 
Through this model, the EPCA would fulfill its primary purpose of set-
ting miles-per-gallon requirements for new vehicles nationwide.290 At 
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the same time, programs such as New York City’s that do not frustrate 
that purpose can go forward and continue to be innovative. This is pre-
cisely situation that Adelman and Engel’s model seeks to foster.291 
 New York City’s and California’s regulations and programs have 
similarities and differences, but both appear to be examples of the 
kinds of environmental progressivism that these commentators laud.292 
It seems unwise to allow the ever-growing reach of the preemption doc-
trine293 and the breadth of the EPCA’s preemption clause to challenge 
these progressive environmental initiatives.294 The best option for New 
York City appears to be a combination of creating new regulations to 
implement its hybrid cab program in a manner that will be successful, 
as well as continuing its efforts to amend the EPCA to allow for more 
creative environmental policies as discussed in the scholarship. 
Conclusion 
 There are efforts in many cities to mandate the use of hybrid vehi-
cles as taxicabs as part of a push for a healthier environment. These 
attempts are part of a larger trend of states and local governments en-
acting progressive environmental legislation, such as California’s large 
scale attempt to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Several of these 
attempts, such as New York City’s attempt to mandate hybrid cabs, have 
faced preemption challenges under existing federal laws such as the 
EPCA and CAA. 
 New York City, Boston, and other cities should, in the short term, 
alter their regulations to make hybrid cab goals possible and serve as an 
example to other cities attempting similar cab programs. In the long 
term, they should lobby Congress to amend the EPCA and join the 
push by states, local governments, and commentators to alter the de-
bate on federal preemption and make way for progressive environ-
mental policies on the state and local level. 
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